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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 14-4753 & 15-1004 
_____________ 
  
AARON L. BELL 
      Appellant in 15-1004 
 
v. 
  
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
POLICE OFFICER DAVID O’CONNOR, Badge #9846; 
POLICE OFFICER COLIN GOSHERT,  Badge # 3210, In their personal capacities, 
                           Appellants in 14-4753 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-02625) 
District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 7, 2015 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 22, 2015) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Plaintiff Aaron L. Bell alleged that Defendants City of Philadelphia and Police 
Officers David O’Connor and Colin Goshert violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  Bell 
brought claims for an illegal stop, false arrest, illegal search, malicious prosecution, and 
municipal liability against the Officers and the City.  After a three-day jury trial at which 
Bell represented himself, the jury found for Bell on his false arrest, illegal search, and 
municipal liability claims and awarded him $100,000 in compensatory damages from all 
defendants and $1,000 in punitive damages from the officers.  The jury found for Officers 
O’Connor and Goshert on the illegal stop and malicious prosecution claims.  After both 
parties filed post-trial motions, the District Court set aside the jury’s verdict on the 
municipal liability claim and otherwise left the verdict intact.  Officers O’Connor and 
Goshert, along with Bell, have appealed from the District Court’s order.1  We will affirm.   
I. 
 On August 5, 2010, Officers O’Connor and Goshert stopped Bell while driving 
and searched Bell’s person and the car.  The officers found a loaded Glock .357 handgun 
in the car and arrested Bell, who had a prior felony conviction.  The gun belonged to 
Bell’s friend who had borrowed Bell’s car that day.  Bell was charged with carrying a 
firearm without a valid license and being a felon in possession of a firearm.  After 431 
days in custody awaiting trial, Bell was acquitted of all charges.   
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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II. 
 We review the District Court’s jury instructions for plain error because defendants 
did not object to the instructions at trial.  Harvey v. Plains Township Police Dep’t, 635 
F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011).  We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law.  In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 
777 F.3d 620, 626 (3d Cir. 2015).   And we review the District Court’s decision on a 
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.  Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 453 
(3d Cir. 2001).   
III.   
 In the officers’ appeal, they argue that the jury instructions on compensatory 
damages amount to plain error because the District Court instructed the jury to consider 
items of damages that were not recoverable.  They assume (and ask us to assume) that the 
jury based its $100,000 award of compensatory damages on the reasonable value of legal 
services Bell expended in defending against the criminal charges and the reasonable 
value of each day of Bell’s confinement while awaiting trial.  The officers argue these 
items of damages were only recoverable for the malicious prosecution claim that the jury 
rejected and thus ask us to vacate the jury’s award and remand for a new trial on 
damages.   
 “Under the discretionary plain error standard, we will reverse the trial court only 
where a plain error was ‘fundamental and highly prejudicial, such that the instructions 
failed to provide the jury with adequate guidance and our refusal to consider the issue 
would result in a miscarriage of justice.’”  Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. New York Times 
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Co., 424 F.3d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 
F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997)).  We find no plain error in the District Court’s instructions 
on compensatory damages.  The instructions tracked our Model Civil Jury Instructions    
§ 4.8.1 and each item of damages mentioned was related to at least one claim that was 
submitted to the jury.   
 The officers nonetheless argue that the District Court should have specified which 
items of damages were recoverable for each claim.  They cite no authority for such a 
requirement in a § 1983 case and the District Court did not plainly err in this regard.  The 
officers also argue that the instructions were erroneous because the malicious prosecution 
claim never should have been submitted to the jury.  They never raised this argument in 
their Rule 50 motion made at the close of Bell’s case.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) 
(motion for judgment as a matter of law “must specify the judgment sought and the law 
and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment”).  In any event, judgment as a matter of 
law was not warranted because disputed facts existed as to whether there was probable 
cause to support Bell’s prosecution.    
 In Bell’s cross-appeal, he argues that the District Court erred (1) in granting the 
City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the municipal liability claim and (2) in 
denying his motion for a new trial on his illegal stop and malicious prosecution claims.   
 First, to prevail in his municipal liability claim, Bell had to establish that: (1) the 
City had a policy or custom that deprived him of his constitutional rights; (2) it acted 
deliberately and was the moving force behind the deprivation; and (3) Bell’s injury was 
caused by the identified policy or custom.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New 
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York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978).  We enter judgment as a matter of law “only if, as a 
matter of law, the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence from 
which a jury might reasonably afford relief.”  Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. 
Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).  The jury’s verdict 
on Bell’s municipal liability claim was properly vacated because Bell failed to present 
evidence to establish a policy or custom that deprived him of his rights.   
 Bell argues that he presented evidence of a policy or custom because the City had 
been deliberately indifferent to a prior pattern of similar Fourth Amendment violations by 
Officer O’Connor.  The parties stipulated that the City was aware of one lawsuit and six 
complaints against Officer O’Connor alleging illegal searches between 2009 and 2013.  
But Bell failed to present evidence to substantiate the allegations, and a reasonable jury 
could not infer a policy or custom from the mere fact that similar complaints were made 
in the past against Officer O’Connor.  See Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  Alternatively, Bell argues that the City adopted a policy when it accepted the 
findings of a police lieutenant who recommended dismissing the Internal Affairs 
complaint Bell filed against Officers Goshert and O’Connor.  This alleged policy post-
dates Bell’s arrest, however, and thus could not have caused his constitutional injuries. 
 Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bell’s motion for 
a new trial on the illegal traffic stop and malicious prosecution claims.  “[T]he district 
court ought to grant a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence only where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand.”  
Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir. 1993).   
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 To show an illegal traffic stop, Bell needed to show that the officers lacked a 
reasonable suspicion that Bell had violated a traffic ordinance.  See United States v. 
Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2006).  The officers testified that they 
stopped Bell because he was missing a registration sticker on his license plate that 
Pennsylvania law requires.  The jury was entitled to credit this testimony and conclude 
that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop.  Bell argues that no 
rational jury could have found reasonable suspicion here because Officer O’Connor’s 
initial report stated that he stopped Bell for an unlawful plate display.  In his testimony, 
Officer O’Connor maintained that the notation was a mistake.  Again, the jury was 
entitled to credit this testimony.   
 A malicious prosecution claim requires showing that: “(1) the defendants initiated 
a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the 
proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or 
for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered 
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal 
proceeding.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).  Bell claims 
that no reasonable jury could have found probable cause because the jury found in his 
favor on the false arrest and illegal search claims.  As the District Court explained, there 
was evidence before the jury that Bell constructively possessed the firearm and the jury’s 
verdict on the false arrest and illegal search claim was not necessarily inconsistent with a 
finding of probable cause.    
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the ruling of the District Court.   
